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7 Shaping Vientiane in a global age
Forces of change
Vientiane's urbanism in the contemporary age has been shaped by a number
of significant new forces. Economic reform, the collapse of Soviet and
Eastern European socialism and closer engagement with the region and the
world are major forces that have affected Vientiane's role in Laos since the
second half of the 1980s. The communist government's engagement with the
Plate 7.1 The Lao PDR national insignia, authorized by the 1991 constitution, fea-
turing the That Luang as key symbol, together with the iconography of
development. Note the irony of the modern highway leading directly to the
base of the historical monument.
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wider world has brought with it an exposure to forces of globalization in a
variety of manifestations, including a heavy reliance on foreign investment
as well as dependence on foreign development assistance for basic infra-
structure, urban maintenance and heritage conservation. Just as sig-
nificantly, ideological and policy adjustments flowing from these changes
have been reflected in the infrastructure and symbolism of nation-building,
with a variety of effects on Vientiane's landscape.
The dissipation of Cold War antagonisms in the region was reflected in
the gradual rapprochement between Vietnam and China, and Thailand and
Laos. The remarkable turn around in regional political dynamics was sealed
with the acceptance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) of Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999). Today,
Laos is no longer a 'buffer state or battleground',l but potentially a hub of
networks linking China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand with
other parts of Asia and the world - a role, as Sisouphanthong and Taillard
suggest, that the Lao kingdoms played before the disruptive onset of colo-
nialism. 2 Economic restructuring is having a more substantial affect on
Vientiane than most other parts of the country. As the capital of Laos and
one of the nodal points in these regional networks, Vientiane is arguably
resuming the prominence it held in Lao political and economic life some
three centuries ago.
Economic restructuring and the end of socialism
The ad-hoc liberalization of the socialist economy that had taken place in
Laos from the late 1970s was formalized and greatly extended at the Fourth
Party Congress in November 1986, with the adoption of the 'New Eco-
nomic Mechanism' (NEM). The first half of the 1980s was a period of dis-
appointing economic performance in Laos. The same command economy
model that was entering a period of crisis in the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and Vietnam was faltering in Laos too. The need for major changes
to the centrally planned economy was made obvious by the slow pace of
economic growth, concerns about high inflation, large budget deficits,
increasing trade deficits, growing dependence on foreign borrowing and a
shortage of public resources to fund the burgeoning number of public sector
projects. 3 But compared to the other socialist countries, Laos' small econ-
omy was more manageable. From the onset of communist control in Laos,
the country's overwhelmingly peasant semi-subsistence economy had limited
severely any comprehensive economic transformation towards a socialist
paradigm. So the relatively confined extent of the modern, monetized
economy in the Mekong Valley towns meant that liberalization measures
could be implemented in a limited, controlled way. The relatively small size
of the Lao public sector also enabled the rapid implementation of quite
substantial reforms, such as the increases in salaries and reductions in
subsidized goods that accompanied the 1979 reforms.
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Thus, while perestroika in the Soviet Union, and liberalization in Eastern
Europe exacerbated economic contradictions within socialism and led to a
general crisis within the system, Laos' program of incremental reform from
an early stage - much of it driven from below as peasants demonstrated
their reluctance to embrace collectivization - produced the conditions for a
more effective, manageable and successful marketization of the economy
after 1986.
Although the implementation of the NEM in 1986 should be seen more
accurately as a consolidation and extension of reforms already tried in pre-
vious years, it remains the case that the measures announced at the Fourth
Party Congress were of profound significance, as they effectively amounted
to the abandonment of socialism - in all but name - by the LPRP. A similar
process has occurred in Vietnam under the so-called doi moi, or renovation
policy.4 The NEM also signalled the emergence of Vientiane's role as the
motor of economic growth in Laos, although many of the problems that
constrained its ability to perform this role during the Royal Lao Govern-
ment (RLG) period - poor integration with the rest of the country being a
primary one - remain today. In fact the NEM's liberalization of private and
foreign investment and emphasis on market forces has had more ramifica-
tions for Vientiane than perhaps any other place in Laos. The capital's built
environment and social and economic structures are, as a result, undergoing
substantial change. The tensions accompanying transition from a centrally
planned economy to a market economy in a one-party state are played out,
sometimes quite dramatically, in Vientiane.
Initial reform efforts were focused on transforming public enterprise
management, and this occurred even before the formal announcement of
the NEM in 1986. The first step involved price adjustment, commencing in
April 1985. Prices were increased between 150 per cent and 2,400 per cent
and affected most commodities sold in state shops. At the same time the
average basic wage in the public sector was increased between 200 and 400
per cent. 5 In the following 2 years several major decrees were published,
specifying and quickening reform. The main aim of these reforms was to
convert the system for managing state enterprises from one based on
administrative (ultimately political) control to one based on economic
incentive (price, profits, taxes, etc); the introduction of freely contracted
trading arrangements between firms in a monetized economy to replace the
system of compulsory supply of goods and barter; and domestic and foreign
trade liberalization, with 'full equality of all sectors with respect to trade
and taxation'. 6 Officially at least, state enterprises lost their privileged status,
while joint ventures with domestic or foreign partners were encouraged so as
to make up for financial, technical or managerial deficits. Private companies
were given the right to sell shares to the public and borrow foreign cur-
rency. 7 Privatization of state firms was announced in 1988, while the state's
monopoly over imports was relaxed to allow private involvement.8 Sub-
stantial taxation reforms were implemented in March 1988, including the
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introduction of new taxes (including income tax and profit tax). Wage
adjustments took place and payment in kind was abolished in March 1989,
while subsidies covering operating losses to state enterprises were elimi-
nated.9 A restructuring of the banking system was commenced and foreign
banks were allowed to open.
The macro-economic effects of the changes spurred by the NEM can be
seen in statistics for economic output. The amount contributed to GDP by
the category 'banking, insurance and real estate' increased dramatically
between 1988 and 1993, from 1.36 billion kips to 21.09 billion kips.lO
Industry contributed 22 per cent of GOP in 1999, up from 14 per cent in
1990. Agriculture's share of GOP declined from 60 per cent in 1992 to 52
per cent in 1999. Services contributed 24 per cent of GOP in 1990 and 25 per
cent in 1999. Over this period, GOP for the nation as a whole increased by
57 per cent. 11 By 2004, industrial output was growing by 12 per cent a year,
the services sector by 6.5 per cent, and the agricultural sector by 4 per cent. 12
Regional and global integration
The decision of the Lao government to expose the economy to market
forces went hand in hand with the imperative to open the country to much
greater regional integration. Vietnam has remained a close partner, parti-
cularly at a political level, where there is still much government-to-government
and party-to-party cooperation. However, as in much of South-East Asia,
China's influence is increasingly being felt, in everything from import and
export trade to business investment and funding for cultural programs.
China views Laos as an important conduit for its goods destined for the
Thai market, and has invested considerable sums in improving highway
links between Yunnan Province and Thailand, through Laos. China is Laos'
third biggest trade partner, one of the top three foreign investors. Beijing
provided $1.7 billion in financial assistance to Laos between 1988 and
200 1 - a considerable proportion of which went to stabilizing the Lao
economy in the wake of the 1997 Thai financial crisis - and recently agreed
to cancel most of this debt. 13 Lao resources such as timber, iron ore, copper,
gold and gemstones, are also increasingly in demand in China. 14 An indi-
cation of the rivalry for influence that appears to have developed between
the Vietnamese and Chinese can be found in the recent construction of
prominent buildings in Vientiane. The large National Cultural Hall (see
Plate 7.2) on Thanon Samsenthai was constructed with $7 million of Chinese
financial assistance in 2000,15 while the new Kaysone Phomvihane Museum
benefited from Vietnamese technical and financial assistance. The heavy
reliance of the Lao communists on Vietnamese assistance during the war
and in the early years of socialist construction is amply reflected in the
museum. The displays, designed with Vietnamese assistance, are substantially
dependent on Vietnamese photographic archives, and the Museum presents
a standard revolutionary narrative.
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The extent and nature of other nations' influence can also be read in
Vientiane's landscape. Relations were improved with Thailand after a period
of tension during 1987-1988 caused by bloody skirmishes over border
demarcation, when Lao forces proved too strong for those of their larger
neighbour. Thailand lifted trade restrictions in 1990, and quickly became
Laos' number one trade and investment partner. The Thai baht replaced the
US dollar as the major trading currency and Thai goods and investment
flooded into Laos. 16 The negative consequences of this high level of trade
and investment dependence were severely felt in Laos when the Thai finan-
cial system collapsed in 1997. While dependent on substantial Thai trade
flows and investment, the Lao government has been cautious about Thai-
land's cultural influence, particularly evident through television programs,
which are highly popular among Lao citizens. In mid-2004, in a measure
reflecting concerns about Thailand's cultural influence, the Lao government
imposed a ban on the showing of Thai television and video programmes in
public places, induding restaurants, hotels, bus stations and markets. 17 The
Lao government frets about the potentially destructive effects of some Thai
and western cultural and social practices - crass materialism, hedonism and
individualism. Not surprisingly, the government is much more comfortable
with the assistance of its ideological brothers, China and Vietnam, in the
state-sponsored cultural sphere. The relationship with Thailand is reflected
in big commercial developments, such as the Lao Plaza Hotel, and the
presence of major Thai banks occupying sites along the capital's major
Plate 7.2 The National Cultural Hall, constructed with Chinese financial assistance
and opened in 2000. Photo by C. Long.
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thoroughfare of Lan Xang Avenue. Efforts to improve transport links
between Laos and Thailand, and ultimately between those two countries
and China, will see the construction of a 3-kilometre rail link from the
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (built in 1994) to Tha Na Laeng, followed by a
9-kilometre stretch to Vientiane. Lao planners then hope to extend the
railway to Luang Prabang and ultimately to the northern town of Boten,
bordering China. IS If constructed, the railway will be the first in Laos, other
than the short-lived goods transhipment line built by the French to bypass
the Khone Falls near the Cambodian border.
Other Asian investors have recently started to target Laos and Vientiane
as a lucrative opportunity. Unfortunately, the Lao government's enthusiasm
for such investment in the capital, and the attitudes of investors to
development - with scant regard for environmental or social costs - has
recently produced projects and proposals of questionable value to Vientiane.
The Singaporean-constructed shopping mall next to the Morning Market
also seems to be a case of imposing on Vientiane a model developed for
Asia's larger cities, with little thought for the social, economic or environ-
mental costs. The construction of a hotel complex on the environmentally
sensitive banks of the Mekong at Vientiane is symbolic of the vulnerability
of the river to damage done in the name of obtaining foreign investment.
Until the mid-1990s, the Vientiane waterfront, extending some 10 kilo-
metres, was still a semi-natural landscape, little changed from colonial
times. From the late 1990s, a major redevelopment of the waterfront has
taken place, with the removal of bars, the construction of parking areas and
substantial earthworks to alter the bank itself. Most intrusive and destruc-
tive was the construction by a Chinese~Malaysian contractor of the Don
Chan Palace Hotel on one of the best areas of recession floodplain in
South-East Asia. The hotel is owned by the same consortium responsible
for the construction of the Dansavanh Casino Resort at the Nam Ngum
reservoir. The concession to allow the construction was negotiated at the
highest level of the Party, thus excluding the government agencies respon-
sible for urban planning, and environmental and cultural protection. 19 The
hotel was finished in time to host sessions of the 10th ASEAN Summit in
2004 and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2005.
Western nations, including Australia, France, Sweden and the United
States (the US normalized economic relations with Laos in 2004), have
developed closer relations with Laos and have become major providers of
development aid. Japan has also become critically important to Laos,
ranking as first among its international aid donors since 1991. In the period
2002~2004, development assistance from these countries represented from
11 to 15 per cent of Lao's national income.2o While western governments,
either directly or through multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World
Bank, have encouraged market-based reform, their investments have been
less visible in the urban fabric of Vientiane, being focused largely on
investments in power generation, such as the controversial Nam Theun 2
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Dam, and gold and gem mining. However, various infrastructure projects
effecting Vientiane have been initiated through foreign grants and loans.
They include the Friendship Bridge linking Laos and Thailand. Entering
Laos just south of Vientiane, the bridge was constructed with Australian
financial and technical assistance (amounting to over $US30 million). From
1995 a major upgrade of the capital's main roads (including construction of
storm water drains) commenced as part of a major urban development
project funded largely by a substantial loan of over $US93 million from the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which included French funding. 21 This
has been followed up from 2001 by a second ADB-sponsored project
($US25 million) which includes upgrades to secondary roads in the capital,
as well as a host of urban environmental, management, and urban community
participation programs.22
The extent of the transformation in Laos' relations with the region and its
greater integration in regional economic and political networks is illustrated
by its engagement in two of South-East Asia's major multi-national orga-
nizations, ASEAN and the Mekong River Commission. Laos' status as a
new ASEAN member was enhanced when Vientiane hosted the 10th
ASEAN Summit in November 2004 and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
in 2005. ASEAN membership since 1997 has provided Laos with political
recognition, technical assistance and trade opportunities. At the same time l
engagement with ASEAN has committed the country irreversibly to the
expansion of the capitalist market place, because the economic goals of
ASEAN complement - and indeed largely depend on - the aims of large
Plate 7.3 The Don Chan Palace Hotel. Photo by W S. Logan.
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funding agencies such as the ADB whose programmes for the Mekong
region countries stress regional integration (through enhancement of trans-
port and other trade-related infrastructure) and the opening of countries to
greater flows of goods and tourists. At the 2004 Vientiane summit, Lao
leaders applied pressure on the wealthier countries of the 'ABEAN six' to
provide economic assistance to the new, poorer members (the so-called
CLMV - Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) in order to narrow the
'development gap' between member states, and this was affirmed in the
formal summit declaration, the Vientiane Action Plan (VAP). At the same
time they affirmed with other members a commitment to increasing eco-
nomic integration with a goal of creating an ASEAN single market (initially
in 11 categories of goods) by the year 2010 (the ASEAN Economic Com-
munity).23 Aside from serving the purpose of show-casing the capital and its
modernizing landscape, the Vientiane summit turned out to be significant
for the Lao government (and its CLMV partners) because of a number of
programmes heralded in the VAP: most notably the agreement to establish
an 'ASEAN Development Fund' that would serve to provide seeding money
for development projects.24
The Mekong River Commission was founded in 1995, with its member-
ship comprising the Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, and with
Myanmar and China affiliated as 'dialogue partners'. The aims of the MRC
are to cooperatively manage the river in a sustainable way, and to use it to
improve transport and trade links throughout the region. Supported by
funding from its member states - and buttressed substantially by grants
from international donors including the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden
and Denmark - the MRC's programmes emphasize sustainable water use,
flood prevention and maintenance of fisheries. The MRC replaced the
Mekong River Committee, which had been established under UN auspices
in 1958 (replacing a previous secretariat) and was charged with the task of
turning the Mekong into an engine of development through major power
and irrigation projects. In the mid-1960s, despite the clear obstacles posed
by civil wars in Vietnam and Laos, an ambitious 'Mekong Project', with
strong backing from the US, was proposed as a panacea for under-devel-
opment and political strife in the region, with a proposed budget of $US10
billion over 10 years. 25 This remained an idealistic dream in the face of the
turbulent geo-political realities, and the Mekong Committee was essentially
moribund by the 1970s. The new organization differs from the old one in
being managed autonomously as a council of ministers and focused on
sustainable resource management rather than hydro-power generation. Iro-
nically, the controversial mega-projects which the MRC avoids in its envir-
onmentally sensitive remit are being implemented by its members'
governments in concert with private investors and large international
lenders like the ADB and the World Bank.
The importance of the Mekong to Laos - a third of the river runs through
the country and 40 per cent of its tributaries originate in Laos - and the fact
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that Vientiane is the only capital actually on the river, were central argu-
ments in the Lao lobbying that persuaded the MRC to relocate its secre-
tariat to Vientiane in 2004.26 Today the secretariat, which provides technical
and administrative support to the Commission, is housed in an impressive
building on the Vientiane waterfront, a testimony to the extent to which the
city is now seen as a pivotal location in the network of important cities of
the region - Bangkok, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Ho Chi Minh City, Rangoon
and China's Yunnan province capital, Kunming. Notwithstanding the
MRC's well-intentioned programmes, however, over-development along the
Mekong - including dam building on its upper reaches by the Chinese and
on its tributaries along its course - pose a real threat to the vision of the
Mekong as a facilitator of sustainable economic growth and regional inte-
gration. 27
For qver a decade the ADB's Greater Mekong Subregion Project has
been the most significant force driving regional economic integration,
holding out the prospect of economic growth for Laos, as well as auguring a
host of future social, environmental and settlement changes for the country
and its neighbours. In 1992, with the encouragement of the ADB, the six
countries of the so-called Greater Mekong Sub-region (Cambodia, the
People's Republic of China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam)
joined a multi-pronged program whose centre-piece has been the construc-
tion of an ambitious road and communications network linking the six
countries of the region. The GMS Program was designed to enhance trade
flows, attract investment, alleviate poverty by generating markets and labour
mobility, and build regional cooperation. The proposed transport arteries
running north~south, east-west and south through the peninsula will,
according to the ADB, form major economic and development corridors,
enhancing the GMS countries' exposure to the globalizing world economy.
In the GMS configuration, important transport corridors pass through
Laos, giving the country a key linking role. The Lao leadership eagerly
embraced involvement in the GMS Project, and announced that Laos
would no longer be 'land-locked', but 'land-linked'.28
The most important corridor running through Laos is the so-called 'East-
West Economic Corridor', with its core element being a road extending
from the Myanmar town of Mawlamyine on the Andaman coast through
Thailand, crossing the Mekong into Laos at Savannakhet and linking to
Vietnam's port of Da Nang. The corridor comprises a number of further
linked routes, including Laos' Route No.8 which runs from Vientiane to the
Vietnamese seaport at Vinh. A section of OMS' northern corridor runs
from Thailand's Chiang Rai across the Mekong and passes through Ban
Houai Xai to Kunming in China.29 Progress on the main GMS-sponsored
corridor routes and affiliated road projects in Laos was interrupted by the
1997 financial crisis, but by 2004 key elements of the system were completed
or under way, including the upgrading of the 1,500 kilometre-long Road N
13, which runs north-south from Luang Prabang through Vientiane to
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Savannakhet, Pakse and the Lao~Cambodia border. Planning for the cross-
Mekong Thai-Lao bridges for the northern and east~west corridors has
commenced. While the role of Laos in the OMS configuration is central,
and the key corridors in the north and central regions will no doubt
stimulate a host of settlement and economic changes, the implications for
Vientiane's position in economic and demographic terms remain unclear.
In a model of the spatial dynamics of contemporary Laos, the geo-
graphers Sisouphanthong and Taillard have proposed the idea that pre-
colonial trading networks are being re-established in the region thanks to
the end of the artificial divisions fostered by the Cold War and the promo-
tion of economic integration by the OMS and ASEAN. 30 They divide Laos
into three regions based on urban hierarchy, provincial divisions, and road
network, including international links. The central region is focused on
Vientiane, consisting of the urban core, the central districts of Vientiane
Municipality and Province, and three peripheral areas of parallel belts. The
first of these belts is the diagonal link between Vientiane and Xiang Khuang
and Huaphanh provinces to the north-east. This, they argue, places Vien-
tiane on the Bangkok-Hanoi axis, although substantial road construction
would be necessary to make it viable. The second peripheral area consists of
eastern Borikhamxay province, which provides a connection between Vien-
tiane and the south of the country, and between Vientiane and the indus-
trial and port area of Vinh in Vietnam, along Road 8. The third periphery
extends from the west of Vientiane to the northern region, on both sides of
the Mekong and spanning Xayabury and Vientiane provinces.3 [
To Sisouphanthong and Taillard, Vientiane can potentially play an
important role linking national and regional networks. But while the
strengthening of axes between Vientiane and Hanoi (via Bangkok) holds
out the possibility of enhancing Vientiane's centrality, they also acknowl-
edge that the historical tripartite geo-political division of the Lao settlement
space - between the northern, central, and southern regions - still exerts a
powerful legacy to resist modern forms of centralization. 32 Admittedly there
is sometimes rather too much hyperbole around Vientiane's future as a
modern capital - one writer proclaimed that 'Vientiane is not a city that
burns bright with neon, but there is nothing, with the exception of good
taste, to stop it from being as dazzling as Kowloon or Singapore ... '33 ~
and much needs to be achieved, especially in terms of infrastructure devel-
opment. There is also a substantial risk that in the rush to develop the
region enormous damage will be done to ecological systems by highway
developments and the exploitation of rivers, as already mentioned. But
while regional and international events may yet intervene in ways currently
unforeseeable, it is clear that moves to liberalize the Lao economy and
integrate the country into regional networks have repositioned Vientiane in
what is likely to become a dynamic area, allowing it to reclaim at least some
of the role that it once held before the devastation wrought by the Siamese
in the early nineteenth century.
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Dynamics of urban change in Vientiane
We saw in Chapter 5 that the central component of the RLG's nation
building efforts, and the primary plank in the United States' anti-communist
strategy in Laos, was the establishment of Vientiane as the centre of the
monetized economy from which the rudiments of a market economy could
be spread to the rest of the country. From 1975 until the end of the 1980s
Vientiane languished as the government concentrated its energies on the
reorganization of agriculture, the implementation of a command economy
and the socialization of the population. It was the NEM reforms that rein-
vigorated the idea that Vientiane could provide the motor for national
development, a concept that also had profound implications for the capital's
built and symbolic environment, as we shall see.
The resurgence of the city has been manifested in a number of ways. For
example, between 1985 and 1990, Vientiane Municipality registered the
highest population growth rate for the whole country, with a mean growth
rate of 4.6 per cent compared to a national average of just 2.9 per cent. This
high growth rate was a result of net migration flows into the city from
adjacent rural areas. 34 Vientiane accounted for almost one half of the in-
migrants recorded between the censuses of 1985 and 1995. Of the arrivals,
16 per cent came from the four other large towns in the Mekong Valley, and
17 per cent from the peri-urban districts of Vientiane municipality. The
remainder came from other provincial capitals or rural districts, mainly along
the north-eastern axis of Huaphanh-Xiang Khuang. 35 Job opportunities in
Vientiane are clearly a major attraction for rural people.
Investment flows clearly favour Vientiane. While a small number of large
projects in the hydropower and mining sectors account for the majority of
foreign investment in Laos, the remainder is largely concentrated in industry
and to a lesser extent in services. Most of the foreign invested firms are
located in and around Vientiane. 36 While the Lao economy grew by 7.2 per
cent in 2004/2005, Vientiane's economy grew by 11 per cent, and the capital
accounts for about 25 per cent of the nation's GDP.37
The impressive growth in the industrial sector (although from a low
base), with output growth figures exceeding 10 per cent since 2001,38 has
benefited the Mekong Valley towns, and particularly Vientiane. The indus-
try and construction sector contributed 53.8 per cent of the capital's GDP
in 2005, an increase of 11 per cent on the previous year.39 Partly this reflects
historical development patterns, with Vientiane being the focus of the very
small amount of industry fostered during the colonial period and the centre
of RLG and US modernization efforts. But the economic reforms of the
NEM and the market pressures they introduced have reinforced the attrac-
tions of the main towns. Manufacturers are attracted by Vientiane's rela-
tively large consumer market, as well as sources of skilled and unskilled
labour. Recent improvements to the road network linking Vientiane with
the rest of the country have also made it possible for firms to benefit from
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agglomeration economies, while improved links with Thailand have opened
that country's much more substantial market to manufacturers in Laos.
Although the government has recently moved to decentralize some decision-
making on foreign investment to provincial level, there are still benefits of
proximity to central government decision-makers for companies establishing
in the national capital. Foreign companies in particular soon come to rea-
lize that there is still considerable political bargaining to be done for devel-
opment approvals and support. Vientiane is also attractive to foreign firms
because of its well-established infrastructure for expatriate staff and higher
standard of living. It is also disproportionately favoured by foreign aid
policy, especially in urban infrastructure provision.4o
There has also been significant growth in the service sector in Laos, and
again Vientiane has benefited disproportionately. Services accounted for
20.6 per cent of the capital's GDP in 2005, a 7.14 per cent rise on the pre-
vious year.41 The liberalization of the banking sector led to an influx of
foreign banks, from Malaysia, Vietnam, but predominantly Thailand. Lib-
eralization of trade and ownership regulations has also encouraged the
proliferation of small trading firms and private businesses, including shops.
Vientiane's main commercial streets are now lined with relatively well-
stocked shops, retailing goods from Thailand, Vietnam, China and other
parts of the world. State shops, in comparison, have declined in number and
lack the consumer pizzazz displayed, often with some style, by newer pri-
vate retailers. For better or worse, Vientiane appears unlikely to escape
international retail trends. Already a large new shopping mall is proposed
next to the Morning Market, and on the outskirts of the city, on Road No.
5 (Done Koi), a commercial exhibition centre, the Lao International Trade
Exhibition and Convention Centre (Lao-ITECC), has recently been erected
by a Thai company at a cost of $7.5 million.42
These new trends have both reinforced and altered Vientiane's historic
development patterns. The old historic core of the city has been consolidated
as a centre of retail, government and business functions, with an element of
gentrification occurring, especially associated with the Nong Chanh wet-
lands redevelopment on Khu Viang Road. But the extension of the city past
the boundaries of the old city wall, a process that began in earnest in the
late 1980s, is now well established. When the Americans built their residen-
tial compound at Km6, it was intended to keep their staff physically and
financially separate from the indigenous town. Now, a trip out to the com-
pound or to the nearby Kaysone Museum leads through a long strip of new
shop-houses and businesses spreading either side of Phon Kheng Road, and
eventually out towards Dong Dok University. Over the past decade, devel-
opment has spread to the east of Khu Viang Road, and then even further east
once Road No. 5 (Done Koi) was constructed. Although there is a consider-
able amount of new development taking place along Done Koi, as with so
much of Vientiane - there is still substantial agricultural land remaining
amongst the urban development, especially to the east of Done Koi.
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New investment is also going into areas on Vientiane's fringe or within
Vientiane Province. A bio-organic fertilizer factory has been established in
Dong Xiengdy village, and a tile factory at Phai Lom village, both in Vien-
tiane Municipality, while another tile factory has been erected in Hathdeua
village, Keo-oudom district, Vientiane Province, and two cement plants
within the province. The old growth corridor between Vientiane and the
ferry crossing at Thadeua and the Chinaimo army camp to the south of the
city has been reignited by the construction of the bridge to Thailand, and
will no doubt receive a further boost with the construction of the railway
linking the two countries. Larger industries, such as coffee processors, a
pharmaceutical factory and the Lao Tobacco Factory are located in this area.
Vientiane's dominant position within Laos' urban hierarchy and the
character of its economy are reflected in employment figures. Vientiane's
econorp.y is dominated by the government sector, commerce and trade.
Together these sectors employ over 50 per cent of the city's workforce.43 The
city's main economic activities, listed in relative importance, are: construc-
tion, timber, business services, electricity/radio/television, transport and
trade. Most of these activities (with the exception of timber, the prominence
of which is due to Vientiane's proximity to the Friendship Bridge and the
Thai timber market) are a reflection of the national capital role that
Vientiane plays.44
Laos' economic liberalization has also literally meant an opening up to
the world. The financial benefits of tourism have been enthusiastically
embraced by the government. Tourist arrivals grew rapidly after Laos came
in from the Cold War: from 14,400 arrivals in 1990 to 463,200 in 1997, and
894,806 in 2004, providing $119 million in revenue.45 Tourists from Laos'
neighbours (Thailand, Vietnam, China, Myanmar, Cambodia) make up the
vast majority of visitors: 658,322 in 2004, of which Thailand accounted for
489,677 and Vietnam 130,816.46 A large number of these visitors spend only
a very short time in Laos (two-thirds of Thai visitors, for instance, spend
only 1 day in Laos) and many are actually engaged in trade or business
activities rather than tourism as such. International tourists numbered
236,484 in 2004 (see Table 7.1.).47 The top five markets for international
tourists are the US, France, UK, Japan and Australia.
As with other aspects of Lao socio-economic development under the
NEM, Vientiane has been at the centre of tourism growth. In 2004 Vien-
tiane Municipality received 544,253 visitors; Savannakhet was the next most
popular destination, with 118,821, while Luang Prabang received 105,513.48
The popularity of Vientiane as a tourist destination seems to be closely
related to its proximity to entry points - half of all visitors enter by the
Friendship Bridge, and 10 per cent at Vientiane's Watay Airport.49 The
large number of Thai tourists entering Laos helps to explain the popularity
of the Friendship Bridge. Although many of the main attractions for inter-
national tourists are not found in Vientiane - natural features, ethnic min-
ority cultures, and the World Heritage sites at Luang Prabang and Vat Phu
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near Champasak - 96 per cent of international tourists (as distinct from
tourists from regional countries) visit the capital. While the city's function
as the nation's main port of entry ensures this is the case, the relatively
small number of places that are easily accessible and the relatively challen-
ging nature of travel to Laos (the country is not yet a mass-market tourism
destination) mean that most international visitors consider a visit to the
capital worthwhile. The city functions as a base for tourists visiting other
parts of the country, either by air or by bus, or, more rarely, by river, and,
although not as picture postcard attractive as Luang Prabang, features a
number of important cultural and historical sites, including the national
symbol, the That Luang.
The growth in tourism has fed improvements in tourist infrastructure.
The number of accommodation establishments in Vientiane Municipality
increased from 81 (with 2,099 rooms) in 1998 to 194 (4,004 rooms) in 2004.
There were also large rates of growth during the same period in the World
Heritage-proximate areas of Champasak (from 18 establishments to 110)
and Luang Prabang (45-120).50 However, Vientiane has a larger proportion
of hotels (46 of 194 accommodation establishments) compared to other
places in Laos; Champasak has the next highest number of hotels - 22 of
110 establishments - while the tight controls over development in Luang
Prabang have constrained the number of large hotels - only 15 of the 120
accommodation establishments in that town are hotels. Other towns tend to
have much higher proportions of guest housesY The number of hotels in
Vientiane reflects its importance as a tourist destination, the need for
accommodation for business and government visitors, as well as the bur-
geoning group travel market largely consisting of Thais who make short
shopping trips to Vientiane (the Morning Market is a major attraction), as
well as government policies encouraging investment.
While large new hotels, such as the Lao Plaza and Don Chan Palace, are
the most obvious manifestations of tourism growth in Vientiane's built
fabric, there are other new tourism-related features in the city's landscape,
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such as internet cafes, bars, and private guesthouses, as well as less concrete
but no less real social effects, including greater exposure of the population
to outside influences, prostitution, drug abuse and a dependence of a
substantial sector of the workforce on the tourist economy.
Perhaps the most revealing indication of the extent to which liberalization
and the introduction of the market economy have disproportionately bene M
fited Vientiane is in income and expenditure figures. Per capita income is 2.3
times higher in Vientiane municipality than the national average, while
Vientiane residents spend a much higher proportion of their incomes on
services than rural dwellers and less on food. The accoutrements of the
modern consumer economy such as cars and telephones are much more
likely to be found in Vientiane than other parts of the country (71.7 per
cent of the nation's 18,139 telephone lines are in Vientiane).52 Poverty levels
in Vientiane are correspondingly lower than for the nation as a whole.
While the incidence of poverty at a national level was 39.5 per cent in 2000,
in Vientiane it was 12.2 per cent (16.7 per cent for the urban areas and 4.5
per cent for the rural areas of Vientiane prefecture).53
The changing urban development process
These broad changes have had a dramatic effect on the process of urban
development in Vientiane. An important facet of this is the changing bal-
ance of private and state activities in the urban development process. The
effective abandonment of socialism has meant that the role of the state as
the dominant agent of large-scale construction is now being challenged by
private capital. 54 This has not entailed a full-scale retreat of the public
sector, but rather the addition of new types of development and new sectors
of urban activity. The opening up of the economy to market forces has
created new demand for hotels, banks and commercial buildings, which is
largely being met by private capital, much of it from overseas investors.
The state and the infrastructure of legitimacy
While the state continues to build collective consumption infrastructure
(such as schools and medical facilities), it has also focused much of its
effort in the built environment on constructing what we might call the
'infrastructure of legitimacy'. Indeed, some of the most significant state-
constructed buildings since 1990 have had a strong ideological purpose. One
of the most important is the National Assembly building, erected near the
That Luang in 1990, in time for the fifteenth anniversary of the establish-
ment of the Lao PDR. This was a time of dramatic change for the LPRP,
not long after the official launching of the NEM, when the Berlin Wall had
already fallen and the rule of the Soviet Communist Party was looking
decidedly shaky. In deciding on a site near the That Luang, the Party hoped
to draw on the latter structure's cultural and symbolic power to help
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legitimize the new building which laid claim to manifest the people's sover-
eignty. It also provided a formal dais from which the Party leaders could
observe passing parades along the That Luang fairground. Given the
national and international context of its construction, the National Assem-
bly building was a brave attempt to develop an architecture distinctive to
the Lao PDR's circumstances. Designed by the Lao architect Hongkad
Souvannavong, the building features a number of motifs that were intended
to reflect the Party's new direction - a combination of Lao national char-
acter and modernization. The increasing recourse to the celebration of Lao
national identity and traditional culture by the LPRP is an indication of its
search for new sources of legitimacy, given that its earlier justifications - the
struggle against foreign intervention and the construction of socialism -
have disappeared.
The .National Assembly building features a complex and didactic symbo-
lism. The triangular steeply raked roof forms in the centre of the facade hint
at the Lao traditional roof form commonly associated with temple archi-
tecture. In this case the three large triangles stand for the three broad ethnic
categories into which the Lao population is divided - the Lao Lum (low-
land Lao), the Lao Thoeng (Lao of the mountain slopes) and Lao Sung
(Lao of the mountain tops). All three triangles are steep, pointing sharply
Plate 7.4 The National Assembly building constructed in 1990 for the 15th anniver-
sary of the Lao PDR, here shown decorated for the 30th anniversary in
2005. Photo by C. Long.
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upwards in a symbolic expression of united progress. The truncated triangle
in front of the three large triangles represents the Party, leading the people.
On either side of the central triangles, the three-level facade is identical and
punctuated by sixteen windows on each side, which represent the sixteen
provinces of the country. 55 However, whether ordinary Lao citizens perceive
this building's didactic symbolism in the way the state and its architect have
intended is another question.
The National Assembly building has had a substantial influence on both
private and public architecture in Laos. This is because its main motifs
emphasize nationalist and development themes rather than typically socia-
list symbolism. The contrast with the large signature developments of the
early years of the Lao PDR, the 150 Bed Hospital and Polytechnic School
examined in the previous chapter, is stark. These were essentially Soviet
designs that deferred little to their local context. The Assembly building
also represented a confident rejection of the bland modernism that char-
acterized the buildings of the period of US influence. Despite the uncer-
tainties facing the regime in 1990, the National Assembly building expressed
a certain confidence that the government's new direction, emphasizing
economic liberalization and national development, would enable it to
surVIve.
Other large state-owned buildings constructed in recent years are mani-
festations of this concern with political legitimacy. The Cultural Hall in the
centre of the city provides a space for temporary displays of Lao culture
and products, and a new Army Museum has been built near the Monument
to the Unknown Soldier, but the most overtly ideological structure is the
Kaysone Phomvihane Museum, opened in 2000. In many ways the museum
is an anachronism: that such buildings, complete with socialist realist sta-
tues made in North Korea could be erected a decade after the collapse of
communism in most of the world, and 15 years after the abandonment of
socialist economic policies by the LPRP itself is an indication of the extent
to which the Party still clings to Marxist-Leninist frames of reference
despite the changes. The museum's location some distance from the centre
of the city, just in front of the old US housing compound at Km6, seems to
speak to the compound's contemporary inhabitants - the Party Central
Committee has its offices there - rather than the general population.
Yet, there remains a strong emphasis on national identity in the new
structure. It was designed by its architect, Vipraseuth Souvannavong, in a
style reminiscent of Lao temple architecture, although some Lao believe the
roof form in particular owes more to Thai architecture than Lao. The utili-
zation of temple architecture to commemorate a dead communist leader
may seem rather odd, but it is a clear indication of the government's strat-
egy of seeking legitimacy by identification with national culture and inde-
pendence through traditional Lao motifs. As such the Kaysone Museum is
the major element in the effort by the Party to construct a personality cult
behind the late revolutionary leader, emphasizing Kaysone's socialist
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rectitude and commitment to Lao independence as models for Lao citizens
to follow.
A substantial amount of the funding for these symbolic buildings has
been provided by Laos' remaining ideologically sympathetic allies, China
and Vietnam. State construction activity with a more practical focus has
tended to be funded by multilateral or bilateral aid. Since the late 1980s,
considerable effort has been put into infrastructure projects with interna-
tional assistance, including the upgrading and rehabilitation of the water
supply, road improvements, sewer construction at That Luang, the rehabi-
litation of the Sihom area, Mekong river-bank protection, renovation of the
airport, cultural heritage conservation and capacity building. Assistance has
been provided by the ADB, UNDP, the World Bank, the Australian Gov-
ernment aid agency, AusAID, the UN Capital Development Fund, the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the EU, the Government
of Denmark and the Agence Francaise de Developpement. 56
Planning the national capital
These infrastructure improvements represent a major component of the
government's long-term strategy for Vientiane ~ to transform the city into
the modern face of the Lao nation. It is this vision of Vientiane as a
Plate 7.5 The Kaysone Phomvihane museum, complete with North Korean-pro-
duced statues. Photo by C. Long.
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modern capital city of a modern nation-state that has driven urban planning
policy for the period since the introduction of the NEM reforms.
In 1985 an Institute of Technical Studies and Urban Planning (ITSUP)
(under the Ministry for Communication, Transport, Post and Construction)
was established. The ITSUP was given authority over town planning for the
whole of the country and set about developing a master plan for Vientiane.
No substantial strategic planning for the city had been conducted since the
1960s, and much had changed since then. By the mid-1980s, concern about
the unplanned and uncontrolled growth of urban areas and resulting poor
living conditions led to the establishment of an Urban Development Pro-
gram of Vientiane Prefecture (UDP) with UNDP assistance. The Program
was also intended to meet the goals concerning urbanization and the
development of human settlements included in the second and third 5-year
plans (1986-1995).57
The UDP commenced in January 1986, targeting five areas: planning,
housing, construction materials, training and information, and documenta-
tion. The immediate goals in these areas were formulating a master plan for
Vientiane, conducting feasibility studies for low-cost housing, and training
planning professionals. 58 In 1989 a plan for Vientiane was produced, its key
goals including: creating a more consolidated city; protecting large rice
fields surrounding the capital; maintaining small rice fields existing in the
midst of urban development; restructuring the internal road network and
planning for roads in areas of future development. 59 A system of zones to
regulate the city's development was proposed. The zones would be: central
zone; peri-central zone; river-bank zone (its character in particular to be pre-
served); perimeter zones; zones of the new extended metropolitan area; iso-
lated zones (rural); sensitive environmental zone; 'zones naturelles agricoles'
(irrigated rice fields); industrial zones; and transport zones (airport etc).60
The plan represented a systematic attempt to order Vientiane's urban
development. This was not a plan for a socialist city, but for a city in a
rapidly liberalizing economy expecting a surge of development. The model
adopted was of the typical capitalist city, with the centre reserved for offices,
government departments, hotel and entertainment facilities, shops, religious,
cultural and sporting functions, some residences and car parking. The sur-
rounding zones would then contain a mix of less intensive development,
becoming increasingly residential, with some integration of shops and small
industry. The plan also proposed the imposition of an urban perimeter
limiting future urban expansion. The urban area thus created would consist
of the existing city plus the proposed extensions to the north and south.
The modernization of Vientiane that was a key theme of the 1989 Vien-
tiane plan was even more prominent in the next major planning document
produced in 1994, the Vientiane Integrated Urban Development Program
(VIUDP). As expressed by the Indian consulting engineers who produced
the planning document, the VIUDP sought to provide policies and objec-
tives for the development of Vientiane as a 'modern city with a human
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face'.61 The monumental structure of the city would animate its role as
the national capital, with a heavy reliance on the historical elements of
the city:
The holy shrine of That Luang, which is believed to encase the
remains of Lord Buddha, dominates the urbanscape with its location
on the highest level of land. It is reported that the only area which
stood above the flooding waters during the devastating floods of 1966
and 1973 was That Luang. Today, Lane Xang Avenue connects the
Presidential Palace to the Vientiane memorial (Anousawari)
[Patouxai] and That Luang in succession of visual urban continuity.
That Luang Avenue, on the other hand, visually connects That Luang
with the Prime Minister's office. Thus the river front in the centre of
the .city, the Presidential Palace, Vientiane Memorial (Anousawari)
and That Luang are to be treated as an urban space continuum and as
a symbolic place for the Nation's capital. Setthathirath Road and
Samsenthai Road run at right angles to the axis of Lan Xang Avenue,
accommodating the major commercial centres of the city. This quad-
rant is also built on the remains of war ravaged Vientiane, housing the
ancient Wats of Sisaket, Pha Kaeo, Simuang, Ongtu and Inpen, That
Dam, and few existing villas built by the French colonial regime. 62
Assessing the current land use distribution in Vientiane, the VIUDP drew a
number of conclusions. First, there was a growing conflict between the his-
toric character of the old core of the city and its function as the central
commercial district, with increasing amounts of unsympathetic develop-
ment. Second, it identified an area where government offices were
concentrated - along the axis of Lan Xang Avenue and That Luang Road ~
although there was still a spread of government buildings throughout the
central area. Third, it noted that small commercial establishments were
distributed along all the major corridors of movement, causing traffic con-
gestion. The legacy of inadequate planning and regulation could also be
found in the presence of non-conforming industries within residential areas.
Diplomatic missions and international agency offices, the VIUDP reported,
were scattered all over the city. Finally, social facilities such as schools and
hospitals are reasonably well distributed, but there was very little organized
public open space.63
For the framers of the VIUDP, all of this added up to the conclusion that
the existing structure of land use was inefficient, chaotic and, above all,
inappropriate for a national capital. Other pressing problems were identified
that highlight the recurring problems faced by Vientiane's urban adminis-
trators and planners: drainage, roads, solid waste management and sanita-
tion. The VIUDP also sought to emphasize the modernization theme by
rather grandiosely proposing railroad stations, a new airport and a bus
public transport system. 64
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The emphasis on the physical modernization of Vientiane was com-
plemented by recommendations for significant improvements to urban gov-
ernance. The system of urban management prior to the mid-1990s reflected
the emphases of the government's early attempts at consolidating power
through a centralized socialist planning system. In this early period power
was concentrated in the national government and its ministries, although in
the more distant provinces considerable autonomy was exercised by local
authorities. The autonomy granted by distance was not, however, available
to Vientiane's administrators. Vientiane Prefecture was headed by a gover-
nor and its government consisted of 14 departments, which were in reality
local branches of the national ministries. The Prefecture had no authority to
collect its own taxes: all revenues it collected had to be transferred to the
National Government. 65
The VIUDP instituted significant changes to this system. As part of the
general national pattern of decentralization of authority (in economic and
urban management matters at least) that has accompanied the NEM
reforms, responsibility for urban development was delegated from pro-
vincial and prefecture level ministries to urban local authorities. The Vien-
tiane Urban Development Management Committee was established in April
1995, the first example of municipal government in the Lao PDR. Subse-
quently, in February 1999, the VUDMC was replaced with the Vientiane
Urban Development and Administration Authority (VUDAA). UDAAs
have also been established in Luang Prabang, Thakhaek, Savannakhet and
Pakse. The VUDAA is an administrative organ at the Vientiane Prefecture
level with responsibility for management of the city's development. 66 The
VUDAA is financially independent and allowed to generate its own rev-
enue.67 Despite these moves to decentralize responsibility for urban man-
agement, there remains little room for direct democratic involvement in the
running of the city. The VUDAA has a president or mayor, who is vice
governor of the Vientiane Prefecture, and a board chaired by the president.
Beneath the board is a manager who is the most senior staff member. 68
There is no provision for direct democratic participation, and while there
have been considerable advances in community participation (largely at the
behest of various projects supported by donor agencies), there is little
experience within Lao planning agencies of real participatory planning and
management.
While the UDAAs provide improved processes for decentralized control
of urban management, the government has been determined to retain cen-
tral coordination of urban planning policy. In 1999 a Law on Urban Plan-
ning was promulgated, having the purpose of encouraging 'the enforcement
of relevant policies and laws in order to develop safe, healthy and sustain-
able cities according to the principles of the national socio-economic devel-
opment plans, and also to protect the national heritage, architecture,
culture, environment and natural scenery'.69 The Law on Urban Planning
assigns the Department of Housing and Town Planning (DHUP) the role of
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the national coordinating body for urban policy, ensuring that the work of
UDAAs fits within the national policy context. 70 This national policy con-
text has been set out in a 5-year program of DHUP, authorized in January
2001. Called COMNAPDEV (Comprehensive National Physical Planning
and Development), its objectives include: poverty reduction through
improved living conditions; participatory planning and empowerment of
local communities; environmental protection and security of persons, goods
and investments. Not surprisingly, the language of the 5-year plan echoes
closely the dominant rhetoric and urban-environmental planning paradigms
of the UN agencies that supply the major funding support for specific
programs in Vientiane. 71
An example of the new planning system and its primary concerns at work
is the Sihom rehabilitation project. This project, undertaken over the period
1991-1997, was funded by the UN Capital Development Fund (nearly
$US5 million), and aimed to solve the particular environmental problems in
the Sihom area in the Chanthabuli district of central Vientiane. A stream at
the centre of the Sihom area, the Nam Passak, was largely stagnant and
polluted by human and domestic waste. Vehicular and pedestrian access
was difficult, with narrow unpaved streets and paths. Water was supplied by
an old and leaking distribution network and disposal of domestic solid
waste was left largely to residents. The project's goal was to tackle these
problems and improve the living conditions of Sihom's residents in a
demonstration project that would also help improve the capacities of the
staff of responsible government authorities. Credit schemes for housing
improvements were also established and community development initiatives
introduced. 72
The Sihom project demonstrates the key components of urban planning
and management efforts in Vientiane since the late 1980s, with its main
emphasis being on basic local environmental improvements such as drai-
nage, water supply and waste disposal. Funding, as with most such projects,
was sourced from outside the government budget, from an aid agency. And,
finally, the project was used to improve local urban management capacity.
The model has been replicated in subsequent projects, such as at the Nang
Chanh Wetlands, although this project appears to have been somewhat
more controversial, with the displacement of a number of low-income
families, contentious beautification works, and the construction of tourism
facilities in the wetlands area.
Over the past 20 years, Vientiane's rudimentary infrastructure has
demanded the most attention from planners, understandably enough, with a
particular emphasis on sanitation, drainage and roads. Related to this has
been the need to regulate land use, not only in the interests of efficiency and
amenity but also to provide the basis for a system of taxation (rates) and to
realize the goal of a modern, organized national capital. Overarching all
of this has been the effort to establish a more effective system of urban
governance and a supply of skilled urban professionals.
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The historical landscape: building a nation, destroying Vientiane?
The modernization of Vientiane that has accompanied the liberalization of
the Lao economy, together with the state's efforts to use traditional sym-
bolism to shore up its legitimacy in the post-Cold War era, have had sig-
nificant ramifications for the citis landscape. On the one hand, certain
symbolic sites, events and historical figures have been given a new promi-
nence in the pantheon of state rituals, while others have been ignored, fun-
damentally altered or even destroyed. During the 1990s Buddhism and the
monarchy - keystones of national identity for the ill-fated Royal Lao
Government - have been allowed to emerge more openly (albeit selectively)
in narratives and representations of the Lao past by a post-socialist state
wedded to the task of projecting itself as a guardian of national identity. 73
Historical and archaeological studies have also become important to the
task of affirming the authenticity of the nation through proving the essential
longevity and integrity of the Lao peoples.74 With regard to the capital of
Vientiane as a site and landscape associated with this past, however, the Lao
state's commitment to preservation and study has been highly selective.
Thus, while the government pays lip service to urban conservation ideals
through legislation and high-sounding planning documents - largely, it
would seem, to gain international development assistance - much of the
material and environmental legacy of Vientiane's history has been destroyed
or neglected. This process mirrors general trends in the region, notably
Thailand, where selected elements of a 'Great Tradition' (focusing on elite
structures and material culture) have been given privileged status as
'national heritage' at the expense of other, often more prosaic, elements of
the urban landscape, to reinforce the official discourses of history and
national identity.75 But in Vientiane, in contrast to the Thai state's con-
servation and display of the old Rattanakosin zone of Bangkok, even ele-
ments of the 'Great Tradition' of Lan Xang's past are being destroyed, as
we shall outline.
In the Lao Constitution, promulgated in 1991, the That Luang was
established as the central symbol in the official insignia of the country
(surrounded by a wreath of rice ears; see Plate 5.1). In that year also, the
That Luang became the centre-piece illustration on the new 1000-kip
banknote.76 The That Luang Festival has been revived as the most popular
and culturally meaningful public celebration on the Vientiane calendar. In
contrast, as Grant Evans has described, the National Day celebrations of
December 2 appear increasingly idiosyncratic, bureaucratic and artificial. 77
Indeed, in recent years the National Day festivities themselves have been
transformed from the old style socialist parade of earlier years into cele-
brations of the Party's vision of Lao traditional culture. The clear message
is that the LPRP needs to be seen as the defender of Lao unity, indepen-
dence and culture, rather than the local representative of a failed global
movement of socialist revolution.
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In contemporary Laos, the government embraces simultaneously a com-
mitment to a utilitarian urban model and an imperative to reinforce the
symbolic elements it sees as important to Vientiane's status as the national
capital. Thus the primary axis of Lan Xang Avenue has been confirmed as
the city's pre-eminent space of political and cultural power and legitimacy.
At one end of this axis are the That Luang and National Assembly, at the
other the Presidential Palace. Between the two are situated many govern-
ment ministerial buildings, with the victory gate (Patouxai) acting almost as
a central pivot, located where Lan Xang Avenue's northward course bifur-
cates: one road leads past the Monument to the Unknown Soldier, the
Army Museum and the Ministry of Defence, towards the Kaysone
Museum; the other leads to the That Luang. The area around the Patouxai
itself was recently subjected to substantial urban design works that have
emphasized the monument's importance and also provided a larger open
space, complete with a cafe that can be used by the city's citizens. Near the
Patouxai, the old RLG National Assembly building, now the Office of the
Prime Minister, is earmarked for a redevelopment scheme that will increase
the size and prominence of this currently under-recognized site. At the same
time as these symbolic elements have been reinforced and emphasized, basic
improvements in urban infrastructure - such as roads and drains - have
given the city a more developed appearance. In the case of Lan Xang
Avenue, road and drain improvements have been combined with beauti-
fication efforts to give the thoroughfare an appearance befitting the main
symbolic axis of the nation's capital.
Yet, as well as consolidation and improvement there have been neglect
and destruction. The government's choice of symbols - which reflects its
particular vision of Lao national identity and history - excludes as much as
it includes. For instance, the surviving structures of the colonial period, and
even many of the pre-colonial period (the That Luang being an exception
here), do not feature in the state's preservation priorities. The old French
Residence lies abandoned and rotting behind the Presidential Palace, while
the old French Treasury building on the waterfront between the Lan Xang
Hotel and the Palace was recently demolished. Such neglect of French
colonial buildings might at first seem understandable in a country formerly
dominated by the French; but such neglect is actually less understandable in
the light of a 1993 ministerial decree (Decree 834, Ministry of Information
and Culture (MIC)), which proclaimed the 'Adoption of all historical Lao
and Colonial buildings as part of national heritage'. The most successful
examples of the restoration of colonial buildings in Vientiane are those
undertaken by private businesses, not government agencies - such as a two-
storey colonial residence on Lan Xang Avenue restored and operated by the
Siam Commercial Bank, and the Settha Palace Hotel, formerly a French
administrative building, in Pang Kham Street.
It is perhaps harder to make sense of the destruction in 1996 of the rem-
nants of Vientiane's old inner city wall along Khu Viang Road, or of the
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neglect of the That Dam (or Black Stupa). Perplexingly, the destruction of
the wall occurred shortly before the proclamation of a new Presidential
decree (03/PR, 1997) on the 'Preservation of Cultural, Historical and
National Heritage'.78 In the case of Khu Viang Road, archaeologists from
the MIC made hurried efforts to document the base of the old walls, but
they had to abandon their efforts for fear of being injured from advancing
bulldozers (working under instruction from the Ministry of Public
Works).79 The remnants of the outer walls of Vientiane have also suffered
from neglect, despite the efforts of members of the MIC from 1992 to
develop a project for the preservation of some sections with the aid of some
small grants from UNESCO. With sponsorship from UNESCO, a Research
and Exhibition Centre was constructed in 2000 next to the largest surviving
(south-eastern) section of the wall in Ban Nongkhai Tai. Adjacent to the
building a large canopy was erected to protect a section of the wall from the
weather. The MIC planned to develop this centre as a focus for research
into the city's ancient walls, but the centre has remained empty and locked
ever since its construction, due to lack of funds for equipment or staff. 8o
From the late 1980s the Lao PDR government has indicated concern for
the preservation of historical sites through the ratification of international
conventions and the enactment of legislation. The increase in legislation and
the incorporation of conservation provisions in town planning reflect this
progressive engagement with the international bureaucracy of the heritage
movement. In 1987 Laos became a signatory to the World Heritage Con-
vention, administered by UNESCO. In the same year the government
nominated the That Luang as one of three sites for consideration as world
heritage sites and this monument was accepted for preliminary listing. In
the 1990s there followed a number of decrees for the protection of 'national
heritage', a reflection of the increasing engagement with UNESCO and the
importance of such engagement to access to foreign funding and technical
assistance for conservation projects. S ! The increasing attention given to the
city of Luang Prabang from the early 1990s (and later the old Khmer shrine
of Vat Phu) as a candidate for UNESCO World Heritage listing highlighted
the government's priorities in enhancing heritage for tourism and empha-
sizing spectacular landscapes. Aided in particular by French specialists, who
undertook surveys and prepared documentation, the Lao government was
successful in having Luang Prabang declared a World Heritage site in 1995.
Although Luang Prabang's historical landscape is highly compromised by
colonial intrusions, its suitability was determined by aesthetic, 'cultural' and
practical factors: the apparently harmonious 'fusion' of colonial and pre-
colonial elements, the 'traditional' way of life of the inhabitants, and the
compactness of the town and related agricultural environs, which enabled
more effective application of planning controls. 82 The protection of the site
of Luang Prabang from threats to its environment and fabric is not without
its problems (major concerns have been voiced by the World Heritage
Committee of UNESCO in recent years). Nevertheless the significance
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accorded this city by the Lao government as an exemplary centre of Lao
history at the expense of Vientiane is obvious, and ironically reproduces the
French colonial division between Luang Prabang as a royal centre and
Vientiane as a primarily administrative capital.
Vientiane has certainly not lacked for advocates to preserve historic sites
and areas - whether among Lao specialists and scholars, or western spe-
cialists, research institutions or governments ~ but their capacity to resist or
modify the state's pragmatic development focus and its tangible impacts on
the capital's landscape have been limited. In 1996 a major conference was
organized in Vientiane by EFEO, with the support of the French Embassy,
on the topic of the safeguarding of the artistic and historical inheritance of
the country. Among other topics; the impact of urban development on
Vientiane's landscape was highlighted as a matter for concern. 83 Beginning
in 1997, the Parisian Institute of Research on Architecture, Urban Struc-
tures and Society (IPRAUS) became involved with Vientiane's Institute for
Urban Research (IUR) in an ambitious task of creating an inventory of
Vientiane's heritage, incorporating buildings, streetscapes and assessments
of ambience. Funded by the French government, this project is linked to the
drafting of regulations for a zone-based urban heritage plan for the capital
by the IUR.84 A variety of workshops and exhibitions have been staged by
IPRAUS and IDR in Vientiane to demonstrate the findings and recom-
mendations of both projects. The zonal idea was first incorporated into
planning legislation for secondary towns (1996) and applied to Luang Pra-
bang; however a full zonal plan for urban heritage protection has yet to be
applied to Vientiane, despite the ongoing work of IPRADS and the IDR.85
The elevation and denigration of particular symbolic elements is nothing
new in the development of cities, particularly national capitals. But the
intersection of the utilitarian model and the effort to reinforce the symbo-
lism of the capital has not only led to the neglect of structures from earlier
historical periods - it has also had an effect on more prosaic aspects of the
urban landscape. The 'modernization' of the capital has seen the revamping
of the Mekong riverfront, including the construction of the Don Chan
Palace hotel on an ecologically sensitive recession flood plain. Previously,
the riverfront consisted of a fairly ramshackle collection of bamboo and
timber bars and restaurants. These were removed when the road was resur-
faced and widened, and parking areas constructed, to be replaced by
equally ramshackle bars with plastic chairs and tarpaulin roofs. A large
structure that can only be described as a shed seems to serve little function
other than to shelter occasional public aerobic sessions! The final appear-
ance of the riverfront remains uncertain, but if the Don Chan Palace Hotel
provides any indication, the pressure of commercial investment is likely
to triumph over broader concerns for sound urban design or the public
good. The widening of Khu Viang Road in 1996 led to the destruction of a
large number of mature trees planted by the French. As with most urban
development projects, this was carried out with little or no public consuJta-
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tion, and the only outcry was from expatriates and belated protests from
some of the embassies after the damage was done. There are no civil society
channels through which public opinion on such matters can be expressed.
In addition, government agencies with responsibility for protection of the
historic landscape ~ chiefly the MIC - lack the power wielded by big infra-
structure-providing ministries like the Ministry of Communications, Trans-
port, Post and Construction. It is difficult for Lao or foreigners to argue
for priority to be given to the preservation of urban heritage when there
are other more pressing needs to be met - it should be remembered that
Vientiane still does not have a sewerage system.
As well, we should note that, in addition to the Lao state, ordinary urban
dwellers are also involved in the destruction of the city's historical fabric.
This is not simply because they are 'ignorant' of 'heritage significance' as
discerned by specialists, but perhaps more so because they embrace differ-
ence values of significance. This was demonstrated in December 2000, when
the people of Ban Nakham gathered joyously to watch the destruction of
the old sim (ordination hall) of Vat Ou Mong as a prelude to the building of
a new structure, an initiative of the abbot. The old sim contained rare mural
paintings of the Lao Ramayana (executed in the 1920s); but this was of
minimal importance to local people who, as good Buddhists, wished to
make merit by building a completely new structure and adding to the over-
all prestige of the temple. The murals of the old sim were documented by a
resident American environmental planner (Alan Potkin), but that was all
that could be achieved in the face of popular enthusiasm and the lack of
any regulations to prevent destruction.86
From her recent research focusing on archaeological sites around Vien-
tiane and popular ideas of historical significance embraced by surrounding
communities, Anna Karlstrom argues that what represents significant
heritage for ordinary people is largely invisible in the archaeological arte-
facts privileged by specialists. Rather, the significant past for ordinary Lao
people resides in rituals, magical symbols and places made potent by local-
ity spirits.87 This world view is widely shared in neighbouring Buddhist
countries such as Thailand; it is sustained by popular Buddhist beliefs in
merit and magic that accord significance to potency, having the effect of
encouraging both preservation and indifference to destruction in the land-
scape.88 How specialists in Vientiane can deal with such 'multivocality' in
their policy and practice remains to be seen. Nevertheless, popular rever-
ence for places deemed as sacred provides a strong motivation among
ordinary Lao for valuing some key historical structures in Vientiane, even if
such reverence is sometimes based on popular misunderstandings of history.
Thousands of ordinary Lao who travel to Vientiane and visit the Ho Pha
Kaeo each year continue to believe that the former royal chapel built by
Anuwong once housed the original Emerald Buddha, although it never did.
Myth, in Laos as elsewhere, plays a powerful role in endowing some of
Vientiane's key historical sites with popular significance, and why, one might
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ask, should specialists disabuse ordinary people of a sacred past in favour of
a secular history?
Conclusion: memory, urbanism and landscape
Vientiane suffers, through design and default, at the hands of an official
state policy that maintains Luang Prabang as an 'exemplary centre' repre-
senting the Lao traditional past, while Vientiane is developed as a utilitar-
ian centre of modernity.89 The only exception to this, as we have seen, is the
centrality of the That Luang and the That Luang Festival, which have
become key components of national symbolism and identity. Although in
Lao historical writings (and occasional state rhetoric) the era of Chao Anu
and the fate of his capital is of great significance in highlighting a history of
brave defiance against powerful invaders, it is somewhat ironic that this
nationalistic imperative has not been translated into much concern for the
material fabric of Vientiane's landscape that survives from Anu's era, or
earlier.
It remains critically important for the contemporary Lao regime to
maintain its control over the past in order to affirm the party's position as a
guardian of the nation and Lao identity. To this end the stories of the Lao
kings embodied in the Khun Borom chronicles have been reconfigured to
emphasize these rulers as nationalist warriors forging unity and heroically
defending the Lao political and cultural space signified by Lan Xang. In the
first Lao official history, published in 2000, Fa Ngum looms large as a ruler
with the skill to achieve this integration.90 As Bruce Lockhart observes in a
recent analysis of the official history, the standard Marxist historiography
that condemns pre-modern polities as 'feudal' and subjects the past to a
periodization based on modes of production is muted in the new history,
and downplayed in favour of a strong emphasis on Lan Xang as a unified
national entity.91 In addition to this, however, there is an imperative to draw
on history to assert 'Lao-ness' against 'Thai-ness', and here we may discern
a continuity with the concerns of earlier non-communist governments and
historians to affirm the integrity of the nation through the narrative of a
distinctive people and political heritage. In the assertion of Lao nationhood
and identity against Thailand, the memory of Chao Anuvong's Vientiane
and the fatal conflict with Siam looms large. In May 1988, during a tense
border confrontation between Thailand and Laos, the enduring significance
of Anu's defeat was revived when former Thai Prime Minister Kukrit
Pramoj proclaimed in a press interview that: 'We should cross over and
burn Vientiane once more'.92 A few months later the Lao government
authorized the publication in Vientiane of a history of the Chao Anu
period, which acted as an indictment of past and present Thai expansion-
ism. Its preface, written by the Chairman of the National Social Research
Committee of Laos, made the significance of these events clear to Lao
readers by stating: 'Chao Anu and the rulers of Lan Xang have passed
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away, but the duty of the people endures and follows them' .93 The new
official Lao history likewise accords to the Lao-Siamese conflict of 1827-
1828 a critical importance, devoting some 81 pages to a treatment of the
conflict and Vientiane's destruction. The Lao-Siamese confrontation is
defined as a 'defence of Lao territory', in contrast to its characterization as
a 'rebellion' in traditional Thai historical accounts. Anuvong is cast as an
example of bravery and nationalism, and the mobilization against Siam in
this 'war of independence' is portrayed as a popular movement demon-
strating unity and courage among the Lao people (pasason).94 In the year
following the publication of the country's official history, the Lao leadership
faced another painful reminder of the conflict of 1827-1828 when it was
announced in Thailand that a leading film director was preparing to make a
historical blockbuster that depicted the wife of the Governor of Khorat
(Thao Suranari) and her heroic role in leading resistance to Lao forces
during Anuvong's campaign. As Lao diplomats pointed out, there was no
historical evidence attesting to the activities of the Khorat governor's wife,
notwithstanding the emergence of a flourishing popular cult surrounding
her statue in that Thai city.95 Lao officials warned the Thai government that
misrepresentation of the Lao King Anuvong as a villain in the film would
pose a severe threat to bilateral relations. Following a flurry of press reports
and interviews in mid-200l, the controversial film appears to have been
shelved.96
In 2003 the Lao government unveiled a statue of Fa Ngum in Vientiane
and declared 5 January to be a national holiday marking the 650th anni-
Plate 7.6 The statue of Fa Ngum, erected in 2003. Photo by C. Long
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versary of the birth of the Lao nation, deemed to begin when Fa Ngum
staged his victory celebrations in Vientiane in 1353. The statue was erected
in the Pakpassak area of the city amidst an enormous celebration which
included the parading of the sacred Prabang image, specially brought from
Luang Prabang for the occasion. The irony of the reactivation of royal ico-
nography by a professedly Marxist-Leninist regime was noted by some
international press observers and Lao exiles, who read into the event a
possible revival of monarchical sentiment and a legitimacy crisis for the
ruling party. One Lao academic in Bangkok observed:
Thus, that the communist government of Laos now allows royal sym-
bolism and promotes monarchical sentiment can be considered as a
re-traditionalization of the totalitarian regime to garner political
security. The Lao government is urgently in need of new symbols for
its legitimacy after long years of authoritarianism.97
Lao officials were quick to deny the association of Fa Ngum's statue with a
monarchical revival. Dr. Souneth Phothisane, Director of the National
Museum and one of the leading promoters of the Fa Ngum statue idea,
affirmed that the point of the monument was 'not to promote a monarchical
regime but to celebrate the true spirit of Laos'.98 The government may now
regard the idea to erect the Fa Ngum statue as problematic, for Souneth no
longer holds his former position.
While the pre-modern past is given more prominence by the state in Laos,
it is notable that the rulers most closely associated with Vientiane's status as
capital of Lan Xang from the mid-sixteenth century are not conspicuous in
public imagery, despite their centrality in official written narratives of the
history of the Lao nation, its defenders and its enemies. A statue of Xet-
thathirat, erected in 1957, still stands near the That Luang, but it has not
featured in public ceremony.99 Arguably, it could be said that Xetthathirat
and Chao Anu are implicit in the built landscape through the presence of
the That Luang and Vat Sisaket, but nevertheless their other legacies
(notably the capital's old outer walls) are rapidly deteriorating. What counts
as 'history' in Laos, and with clear consequences for Vientiane, is deter-
mined by those who hold the power to assign priorities and determine
policy, despite the existence of contrary views among Lao specialists in
some parts - the least powerful - of the bureaucracy, and the presence of
foreign heritage specialists who hold rather more nuanced views about
conservation practice. Yet it is easy enough for academics and conservation
purists to bemoan the fate of an urban landscape that has already been
fractured and fragmented by the historical processes of pre-modern politics
and colonialism. Beguiled by modern national boundaries which isolate the
city from its once flourishing trans-Mekong assemblage of associated urban
sites on the Thai side of the river - the port of Viang Khuk, the meuang of
Tha Bo, Sri Xiang Mai and Phon Phisai ~ journalists and writers of tourist
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guidebooks continue to brand the city as a timeless sleepy town. But the
Lao have to deal with what they have, both in terms of what remains in
their national territory and urban landscape, and in terms of what resources
are available to them to deal with this highly compromised legacy.
Entering the twenty-first century, Vientiane in political terms commands
a prominence in Lao affairs that it has not enjoyed since the sixteenth cen-
tury. Now, as then, Vientiane presides over a differentiated and geo-
graphically divided territory. The Lao capital may be well positioned to
expand economically by harnessing the new trans-regional communication
and trade networks developed under the ADB's OMS schemes, now being
boosted by encouragement from ASEAN; then again, the Lao capital may
be by-passed and other centres such as Savannakhet could well outstrip the
capital economically in the future. Christian Taillard has suggested that a
new type of urbanism has emerged in Laos, one that builds on the effects of
colonialism; it is an urbanism where differences between city and country
are starkly highlighted in contrasting ways of life and economies, disrupting
an earlier urbanism of cultural and economic synergy built on ritual and
pre-modern economic exchange. lOO Although this contrast distinguishes
Vientiane from its own region and the country as a whole in the con-
temporary period, there is nonetheless an echo of an earlier Lao urbanism,
reflected in the revival of Vientiane's key religious monuments and the state
ceremonies built around them. While the traumatic erasure of the capital
nearly two centuries ago is forever written in Vientiane's landscape, its key
symbols function to evoke the idea of a Lao meuang, which, however com-
promised, functions as one of the key foundations for a Lao national past
and identity.
